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11月6日 A Roadmap for U.S.-China Collaboration on Carbon Capture and Sequestration The report provides a framework for long-term bilateral cooperation in the development, demonstration and deployment of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies. The report identifies three specific areas of collaboration with China on CCS and outlines how such partnership would accelerate CCS deployment in the United States by five to ten years while generating jobs and consumer savings.
Since both the United States and China rely heavily on coal as an energy source, addressing emissions from coal combustion is a necessary component of a portfolio approach to tackling climate change. Carbon capture and sequestration is a process that mitigates harmful greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use by separating and capturing carbon dioxide from large point sources such as coal-fired power plants and storing it from the atmosphere through underground geological formations. Download the report  Download the Chinese version  This Report is a Partnership Among: Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director Albert G. Chang, Fellow Laura Chang, Program Officer Center for American Progress Andrew Light, Senior Fellow Julian L. Wong, Senior Policy Analyst Dan Sanchez, Special Advisor Monitor Group Scott R. Daniels, Senior Partner Kurt Dassel, Partner Vivek Sekhar, Consultant John Benjamin Woo, Consultant Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory S. Julio Friedmann, Carbon Management Program Leader, Energy & Environmental Directorate This report benefited from the input and expertise of a wide array of individuals: Frank Alix, President, Powerspan, Inc. John Ashton, Special Representative for Climate Change for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Bill Banig, Director of Governmental Affairs, United Mine Workers of America Bruce Burton, Political/Legislative Affairs, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Brindusa Fidanza, Associate Director, Environmental Initiatives, World Economic Forum Barbara Finamore, China Program Director, Natural Resources Defense Council Robert Finley, Director, Advanced Energy Technology Initiative, Illinois State Geological Survey Sarah Forbes, Senior Associate, World Resources Institute Orit Frenkel, Senior Manager for International Trade and Investment, General Electric Kelly Sims, Gallagher Professor of Energy and Environment Policy, Tufts University Banning Garrett, Director of Asian Affairs, The Atlantic Council Kate Gordon, Vice President for Energy, Center for American Progress Dietrich Gross, CEO, Jupiter Oxygen Corporation Tony Haymet, Director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography Gang He, Research Associate, Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Tom Heller, Professor, Stanford University Law School; President and Founder, Climate Policy Institute Ken Humphreys, Researcher, Clean Fossil Energy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Melanie A. Kenderdine, Associate Director, MIT Energy Initiative C.S. Kiang, Director, China Low Carbon Cities Initiative Joanna Lewis, Assistant Professor, Science, Technology and International Affairs, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Jonathan Lewis, Staff Attorney, Clean Air Task Force Lin Jiang,Vice President and Director of the China Sustainable Energy Program, Energy Foundation George Polk, Founder, European Climate Foundation Jingjing Qian, Senior Research Associate, Natural Resources Defense Council Susan Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California Taiya Smith, Senior Associate, Carnegie Energy and Climate Program and the Carnegie China Program Debbie Stockwell, Head of CCS in Developing Countries, International Climate Change and Energy, UK Department of Energy and Climate Change S. Ming Sung, Chief Representative Asia Pacific, Clean Air Task Force Matthew Webb, Coal Campaign Leader, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thomas Weber, Vice President, Jupiter Oxygen Corporation Stephen Wittrig, Director, Advanced Technologies Group Research and Technologies, BP and Tsinghua University Low Carbon Laboratory The views expressed in this report are those of the primary authors only and do not necessarily represent those of the above advisors and reviewers. 10月31日
He Gang October 23, 2009
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3294
China needs carbon capture and storage technology to decrease its emissions from coal power, but the transition will be costly and difficult. In the first section of a two-part report, He Gang surveys an energy dilemma.
“These advanced technologies are integral to future energy strategy. This is important not only for China, but also for other nations who can gain valuable lessons from the country's experiences.”
Carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that stops carbon dioxide produced by coal plants being released into the atmosphere, is essential in order to cut carbon emissions and thus mitigate the impacts of climate change. Accordingly, China’s ministry of science and technology already has a range of CCS technology projects underway. CCS has also featured prominently in the government's National Outlines for Medium and Long-term Planning for Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2020), the National Climate Change Programme and other national plans on basic and high-technology research and development.
Existing demonstration projects include: the GreenGen project, which is a joint initiative by Huaneng and major state-owned energy giants, combining integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology with CSS; Shenhua’s coal-to-liquids and CSS project in Ordos; Huaneng’s post-combustion capture project in Gaobeidian in Beijing; and a new project in Shidongkou, in Shanghai.
China is also engaged in international partnerships, such as the UK-China NEZC initiative and Cooperation Action with CSS China EU (COACH). China also participates in the United States-led Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum and is a part of the FutureGen Alliance. Cooperation agreements are also underway with Japan and Australia.
China is carrying out research, development and demonstration of CCS technology, but it is still at an early stage. According to predictions by the International Energy Agency, by 2050 CCS will provide 14% of the emission reduction required to stabilise the climate, 20% to 25% of which will come from China, with 60% of those cuts coming from the installation of CCS technology in power plants.
Given China’s circumstances and strategic needs, our most pressing task is to make preparations for CCS technology and policy.
The importance of CCS
China is a coal-rich country, but lacks oil and gas. According to BP, the country has 114.5 billion tonnes in its coal reserves, about 13.5% of the global total, compared to 2.1 billion tonnes of oil and 66.54 billion cubic metres of natural gas, accounting for 1.3% and 1.1% of the world total respectively.
In 2008, China imported 179 million tonnes of crude oil, meaning it relies on imports for 49.8% of its oil consumption. This reliance is increasing. Rocketing oil prices in 2008 gave coal-to-liquids technology a boost, with experts predicting that by 2020, China will be able to produce the equivalent of 35 million tonnes of oil with this method: enough to replace about 25% of oil imports.
However, coal-to-liquids technology is also a significant producer of greenhouse gases, and it will be necessary to reduce those emissions. Therefore, the combination of CCS with coal-to-liquids will be important.
IGCC technology currently achieves 40% to 43% efficiency, and can achieve as high as 50% efficiency. Although the costs are higher than that of super-critical or ultra-super-critical turbines, taking CCS costs into account gives IGCC a clear advantage. Also, IGCC reduces pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and sulphur. IGCC is expected to contribute significantly to energy security, though still with some risks due to high costs and technological uncertainty.
These advanced technologies are integral to future energy strategy. This is important not only for China, but also for other nations who can gain valuable lessons from the country's experiences.
If China uses its late-starter advantage and quickly masters proprietary manufacturing and innovations, it will find advantages in manufacturing costs, personnel and capital, potentially becoming a new centre of manufacturing and exporting.
CCS is a wide-ranging area, covering chemical, power-generating and geological fields. The research, development and demonstration of the technology will lead to rapid progress and technological innovation in these fields.
Obstacles
The costs of capturing carbon are huge. Research from Energy Technology Innovation Policy, at Harvard University in the United States, found that carbon capture alone (not taking into account transportation or storage, for instance) in a first of a kind power plant would cost US$100 to $150 per tonne of carbon that is abated, increasing the cost of power by US$0.10 per kilowatt-hour in comparison to a super-critical pulverised coal plant. Using mature technology, the costs would be approximately US$30 to $50 per tonne of carbon abated. The Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that the addition of CCS technology increases electricity generation costs by 40% to 80%. So, although combining IGCC and CCS can reduce the costs of CCS, the overall costs of electricity generation will still increase 40% to 60%.
China’s potential for geological carbon sequestration is huge – but not currently quantified. Joint research by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the United States and the Wuhan Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences calculated a theoretical capacity to store 2,300 billion tonnes of carbon. By calculating distances between potential storage sites and 1,620 major emissions sources, the cost of transportation and storage (not including capture) was estimated to be below US$10 per tonne of carbon.
Due to China’s complex geology, there is uncertainly over carbon sequestration. Of the storage methods currently being investigated, CO2 enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and enhanced coal bed methane recovery (ECBM) have the greatest potential, due to the potential for profits.
Public acceptance of CCS also impacts on the feasibility and risks of its adoption. Vattenfall’s first CCS demonstration project at Schwarze Pumpe in north Germany had to be abandoned due to public opposition, with the carbon captured pumped straight back into the atmosphere.
Furthermore, the IPCC special report on CCS shows that the addition of CCS reduces the efficiency of coal-burning power generation by 20% to 30% due to energy penalties: a plant operating at 40% efficiency would be reduced to between 25% and 30% efficiency.
In China, the cost of post-combustion capture in power plants would be US$130 per tonne of carbon abated, increasing generating costs by 20% to 30% and reducing efficiency by 8 to 10 percentage points. Therefore, the addition of CCS will require the burning of roughly 25% more coal in order to generate the same quantity of electricity. In 2008, China burned 2.72 billion tonnes of coal, 1.18 billion tonnes of which was used in power generation. If CCS was added to all of China’s power plants, an extra 290 million tonnes of coal would be required to generate the same amount of electricity.
The cost of that extra coal consumption will be passed on through the entire coal industrial chain: to personnel, capital, road, rail and water transport, as well as in coal mining, transportation and storage. Factoring these expenses into the overall cost, it is clear that even greater pressure will be exerted on a coal industry already stretched to the limit. And costs would be even higher if “externalities” such as environmental impacts and safety were considered. So, calculating the costs of CCS can not be restricted to the costs of installing and running the technology: the extra costs the energy system will incur as a result of CCS must be considered.
The price of coal itself accounts for 80% of the costs of generating electricity, hence power plants are very sensitive to changes in the cost of coal. Low margins in the power sector mean it cannot absorb the costs of CSS. Although China's coal sector is gradually starting to operate on market principles, the power industry is still very much under central control. The state has introduced some changes in pricing, but electricity prices are still managed in order to ensure economic growth and social stability.
According to the China Electricity Council, increases and fluctuations in the price of coal last year caused losses for power generators of 70 billion yuan (US$10.3 billion), 40 billion yuan (US$5.9 billion) of which was lost by the five major power firms alone. Therefore, power companies are unable to pass the increase in coal costs on to consumers, much less the costs of CCS.
This is a crucial time for energy saving and emissions reduction, as well as a stage of rapid development in hydro, solar, nuclear and other new energy sources. In 2008, wind power generation capacity increased from 0.76 gigawatts to 13.24 gigawatts. Increasing that to the target of 30 gigawatts will require over 1 trillion yuan (US$146 billion) in investment. For solar power to reach its target of 10 gigawatts, there will need to be around 300 billion yuan (US$44 billion) in investment. Furthermore, the country needs 750 billion yuan (US$110 billion) to achieve its aim of having 5% of all electricity generated by nuclear power by 2020.
The National Energy Administration predicts that China needs 2.5 trillion yuan in investment to meet the target of drawing 16% of all power from renewable sources by 2020. CCS will have to compete with these new energy sources for funding. New energy fits in with China’s future overall energy strategy; it will have knock-on effects in terms of upgrading industrial capacity and increasing employment. Therefore, it should be the focus of investment. Currently, there are huge opportunity costs associated with widespread implementation of CCS.
The implementation of CCS in China faces the same obstacles it does globally: issues that arise from the costs, the storage, the risks and the uncertainties. But the coal-and-electricity relationship in China means that the costs of CCS cannot be passed on to end-users with higher prices; the extra expenses will have to be absorbed by the entire energy system.
Therefore, if CCS is to be implemented on a large scale in China, international climate-change mechanisms will need to take financing into account. Without stable external sources of funding, CCS is unlikely to be a priority for development in the short term. The more closely international climate policy is aligned with China’s own incentives and the unique context of its coal and power markets, the better chance it will have of realising the optimal role for CCS in global climate efforts.
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3296
In the final segment of his two-part report, He Gang sets out his technical and policy recommendations for China's adoption of an important technology.
“China’s geology is complex; the country needs to conduct more surveys of on-shore and off-shore coal, oil, gas basin and salt formations that have the potential for carbon sequestration.”
Considering China’s circumstances and strategic requirements on the energy front, discussed in theprevious section of this article, there are three aspects of the situation that need attention if the country is to make the technical and policy preparations for CCS.
First, China needs more more capacity building:
* CCS technology is not yet mature. China needs to focus on research-and-development, particularly with attention to the country's energy security; hold demonstrations of coal-to-liquids, IGCC and CCS technology; explore the economic sustainability of enhanced oil recovery and enhanced coal-bed methane; and analyse and evaluate future CCS technological pathways.
* China’s geology is complex; the country needs to conduct more more surveys of on-shore and off-shore coal, oil, gas basin and salt formations that have the potential for carbon sequestration. Comprehensive surveys of geological structure, storage potential, the risk of leakages and the feasibility of monitoring are necessary.
* There needs to be risk evaluation and management for all stages of CCS: capture, transportation and storage.
* China must establish CCS management structures, laws and regulations.
* China needs to increase public awareness of CCS, which means increasing public knowledge of the value and the risks of the technology.
Second, sources of funding should be expanded. Currently, fund transfers mainly take place via the international carbon market. As the funds available for CCS in China are very limited, international financial investment and support are very important.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Kyoto Protocol’s three mechanisms, and is a key part of encouraging developing nations to participate in global emission reductions. Currently, its executive board has raised the possibility of allowing CCS projects under the CDM. This is still highly controversial; opponents hold that CCS emissions reductions will weaken the effectiveness of the CDM’s market in Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
In the current market, carbon dioxide (CO2) costs between 8 and 23 Euros (US$12 to $34) per tonne: much less than the cost of CCS (from 50 to 100 Euros, or US$75 to $150, per tonne of CO2). Even if CCS were included as a CDM project, there would be a significant price gap, which means CCS would have to be funded through other channels.
The fluctuating price of CERs also means that CCS will struggle to attract stable investment through this channel. Sectoral emissions reduction mechanisms may bring the power sector as a whole into emissions reduction arrangements, but this is still at an exploratory stage. Therefore, an international climate-change agreement must find new financial mechanisms to meet the needs of CCS implementation.
Third, we must strengthen international cooperation. International probes into CCS are still underway. The United Kingdom has legislated that new power plants must be “carbon-capture ready” if they are to connect to the power grid. The United States has announced an investment of US$1 billion to restart the FutureGen project, and is to build an IGCC+CSS demonstration plant in the mid-western state of Illinois. The European Union’s economic stimulus plan includes 1.05 billion Euros (around US$1.6 billion) in investment for CCS technology at seven power plants, with a “CCS Alliance” of 12 demonstration plants to be formed by 2012. In July 2009, China and the US announced plans to develop the “US-China Clean Energy Research Center”.
As cooperation between China and the US, Canada, the EU, Japan, Australia and other countries continues in the CCS field, China will form global links to the CCS industry, remain up-to-speed with technical advances and exchange know-how. This will lay the foundations for China to master the technology – and participate in the global effort to address climate change.
For more information, download the full report Real Drivers of CCS in China and Implications to Climate Change Policy by Richard Morse, Varun Rai and Gang He.
He Gang is research associate at Stanford University’s Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. ghe at stanford.edu
2009年10月23日
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/3296
中国需要碳捕获和储存技术以减少燃煤电厂制造的碳排放。然而这场过渡势必耗资巨大且困难重重。在何钢关于中国CSS发展报告的第一部分,他研究了其中存在的能源困境。
“其中与未来能源战略密切相关的煤制油技术、IGCC等先进发电技术,不仅对于中国有着重要战略意义,也为其他国家提供了可借鉴的技术经验。”
国际气候政策越符合中国自身的激励机制及特殊的能源背景,越能有效发挥CCS在中国的积极作用。要在中国大规模发展CCS,国际气候制度必须考虑如何为其融资。
在中国发展CCS,除了面临成本过高和储存不确定的风险与障碍外,中国煤电结构也使得CCS的成本无法通过提高电价从而转嫁给终端用户,而且整个能源系统还将负担起由于能源损失增加的成本。
CCS是大量减少温室气体排放以减缓气候变化带来的威胁的必要手段。煤炭是世界上增长最快的能源,煤炭燃烧也是全世界最大的温室气体排放来源。中国的能源消耗严重依赖煤炭。虽然国家已经采取了强有力的措施发展清洁可再生能源,“以煤为主”的能源结构短期内仍难以改变。煤炭作为基础能源,对保障能源的供应起到了非常重要的作用,但是煤炭燃烧释放的温室气体也给气候变化挑战带来了世界性的难题。2008年,中国煤炭生产总量达27.2亿吨,电力生产的80%来自煤炭,全国CO2排放量达68亿吨,均居世界第一。据国际能源署(IEA)的预测,到2050年,CCS约可提供稳定气候所需要减排量的14%,而世界CCS减排量的20-25%将来自中国,这当中60%将依靠CCS在发电厂的应用。
目前,CCS在中国仍处于研究、开发和示范阶段。科技部开展了一系列针对CCS的研究课题。《国家中长期科技发展规划纲要(2006-2020)》、《中国应对气候变化国家方案》、国家863计划及973计划都把CCS作为研究和开发的重要内容。已有的示范项目包括探索整体煤气化联合循环发电(IGCC)+CCS技术路线的华能“绿色煤电”项目;探索煤制油(CTL)+CCS的技术路线的神华鄂尔多斯煤制油项目,以及探索燃烧后捕捉的技术路线的华能北京高碑店和上海石洞口碳捕获项目 等。与此同时,中国也开展了广泛和深入的国际合作。如中英近零排放发电(NEZC)和中欧CCS合作项目(COACH)。中国参加了美国主导的碳收集领导人论坛,并加入未来发电的计划。中日、中澳也在积极推进相关领域的合作。
CCS对于中国能源战略的重要意义
中国是一个“多煤少油少气”的国家。在中国一次能源生产和消费构成中,煤炭所占比例高达三分之二以上。虽然近年来可再生能源和清洁能源的比重有所提高,但专家预测到2050年,煤炭在能源中的比例仍将占50%以上。据BP能源统计综合中国能源储量数据,中国约有1145亿吨煤炭储量,约占世界煤炭总储量的13.5%;而石油储量仅21亿吨,天然气储量仅665.4亿立方米,分别占世界总储量的1.3%和1.1%。这种能源基础决定了在相当长一段时间内,煤炭仍将在总体能源中占有重要的地位。而且由于经济的快速发展和能源消耗的迅猛增长,温室气体排放也大量增长。
2008年,中国进口1.79亿吨原油,石油对外依存度达49.8%,进口金额达190亿美元,石油的对外依赖度越来越高。而煤制油(CTL)技术也随着2008年油价的攀升也一度受到了热捧。专家预测,到2020年,煤制油技术预计可生产石油3500万吨,当前每年石油进口约为1亿吨,2020年石油进口将达到1.5亿吨,煤制油可替代进口石油的25%左右。虽然煤制油的前景仍受到石油价格、水资源、煤炭价格和技术风险及成本等因素的制约,但对于中国的能源安全仍具有十分重要的战略意义。与之同时,煤制油过程也是温室气体排放相对集中的过程,在煤制油过程中减少温室气体的排放是必然要求,同时也为之提供了相对广阔的空间。CTL+CCS因之也成为重要的发展技术路线。
2006年开始,国家提出“十一五”能源效率提高20%,主要污染物排放减少10%的目标,并采取强力措施推进“节能减排”战略,而这些目标的实现,主要依赖电力、钢铁、水泥等高耗能行业的节能目标的实现。其中之一就是发展清洁煤技术,提高发电效率并减少排放。目前,IGCC技术的效率可达到40-43%,最高效率可达50%,虽然较超临界、超超临界技术成本要高,但如果把CCS的成本也考虑在内,IGCC将具有非常显著的优势。而且IGCC在减少SOx、NOx等污染物上也具有较好的表现。IGCC技术路线仍然有较大的不确定性,但从能源战略角度考虑仍占有重要地位。
国家把技术创新作为能源发展的战略措施之一。目前,中国拥有自主知识产权的发电技术已越来越多,但一些核心技术如气化炉、耐高温高压的材料等方面仍主要依赖进口。CCS是未来能源发展和气候保护的重要储备技术,因此在应对气候变化的共同愿景下,国际机制的设计也有利于该技术的转让与合作。其中与未来能源战略密切相关的煤制油技术、IGCC等先进发电技术,不仅对于中国有着重要战略意义,也为其他国家提供了可借鉴的技术经验。如果能利用后发优势并迅速掌握拥有独立知识产权的技术生产和创新能力,中国凭借在制造成本、人力资源、资本动员等方面的优势,将来很可能成为相关技术的新制造中心,创造技术出口机遇。同时,CCS是一个很庞大的系统工程,涉及化工、发电、地质等诸多领域。CCS的研究、开发和示范,将会引导化工、发电、地质等领域技术获得突飞猛进的发展,从而带动一大批相关领域的科技创新。
CCS规模化发展的障碍
碳捕获成本高昂。哈佛大学能源技术政策小组一项最新的研究表明,相对超临界电厂,仅碳捕获(不包含运输和储存)一项,先锋电厂成本就高达100-150美元/吨,电力价格将增加10美分/千瓦时;技术成熟后成本约为30-50美元/吨。IPCC关于CCS的特别报告研究表明,增加CCS将使燃煤发电成本提高40-80%。也就是说,IGCC+CCS虽然能减少CCS的成本,却会使发电总体成本增加40-60%。
中国的地质储存潜力虽然很大但有不确定性。美国太平洋西北国家实验室和中国科学院武汉岩土力学研究所一项研究表明,中国理论上拥有地质储存潜力达2.3万亿吨,通过计算中国1620个主要排放源与潜在地质储存的距离,初步估计运输和储存的成本约在10美元以下,但这个不包含捕获成本。由于中国的地质条件相对复杂,储存条件不确定性较大,目前正在探讨的储存方式中,通过CCS增加石油采收率(EOR)和提高煤层气采收率(ECBM)因为能带来经济收益所以具备较大潜力。
CCS 的风险包含在二氧化碳捕获、运输和储存各个环节的风险,如资金成本、技术风险、管制的不确定性、碳储存的泄漏风险等,因此必须加强这些过程的风险管理。此外,公众对CCS的接受程度也直接决定了采用CCS的可能与风险。大瀑布电力公司曾在德国北部进行了全球第一个碳储存的示范项目——施瓦茨碳储存项目,却因为地方居民的强烈反对,不得不取消而直接将已经捕获的CO2重新排放到大气中去。
IPCC关于CCS的特别报告研究表明,增加CCS将使燃煤发电效率损失20-30%,以一个效率为40%的电厂为例,增加CCS将使其效率损失达10-15个百分点(即增加CCS 后的同等电厂效率仅为25-30%)。对于中国而言,发电厂运行燃烧后捕获,碳捕获的成本约为130美元,发电成本将提高20-30%,同时其效率将损失约为8-10个百分点。因此,要生产同样多的电力,CCS相对于无CCS的条件要多消耗约25%的煤炭(取20-30%的均值)。依此计算,2008年中国的煤炭用量为27.2亿吨,其中用于发电约为11.8亿吨,假如所有电厂全部安装CCS,要生产同等的电力,约需要在此基础上增加煤炭达2.9亿吨。增加的煤炭消耗的成本还将通过煤炭的产业链条扩散到整个能源系统,包括煤炭的生产、运输、储存、转运所需的人力、资本、铁路、港口、船舶等。把增加煤炭消耗计入成本,将给本已超常规生产和超容量运载的煤炭系统增加额外的负担和成本。如果考虑煤炭生产、运输环节的外部成本(如环境、安全和生态影响),这一数字将更高。因此,在考虑发展CCS的成本时,不能只考虑CCS技术建设和安全以及在CCS实际发生的成本,还应系统考虑能源系统为此增加的成本。
煤炭约占电厂成本的80%,因此煤炭作为电厂的主要成本,对煤炭的消费将非常敏感。而由来已久的煤电矛盾使电力系统很难消化CCS增加的成本。中国的煤炭已 经逐渐市场化,而电力则仍然处在高度中央控制的改革阶段。虽然国家也尝试通过建立“煤电联动”机制理顺煤电矛盾,但由于电价的基础性作用,国家为保障经济 发展和社会稳定,电价仍然由国家协调规划。据中国电力企业联合会统计数据显示,由于煤炭价格的上涨与波动,2008年电力企业全行业亏损700亿元,仅五大电力集团亏算就达400亿元。这意味着电力企业无法通过简单提高电价的方式把煤炭价格提高增加的成本转嫁给消费者,更不用说转移CCS的成本了。
当前是节能减排的关键时期,也是水电、太阳能、核电等新能源发展最为快速的阶段,2008年,风电装机容量从2004年的0.76GW增长到13.24GW,要实现规划的30GW的目标,需要投资1万亿以上。太阳能发电规划要到达10GW,约需要投资3000亿元。核电要达到2020年5%的目标,约需要投资7500亿元。国家能源局预测,要实现国家关于2020年可再生能源达到16%的目标,预计将需要多达2.5万亿的投资规模。而规模化CCS势必和新能源争夺投资资源。新能源符合中国未来的总体能源战略,且具有增加就业、提升产业等溢出效应,应作为投资的重点领域,当前规模化发展CCS 隐含了昂贵的机会成本。
从上述分析可以看到,CCS在中国要规模化发展,除了面临CCS在全球普遍面临的成本、储存、风险和不确定性障碍外,也不能忽视中国特定的能源结构和煤电矛盾等因素造成的困难,在没有稳定的外部资金来源支持的情况下,CCS短期内难以成为中国的优先发展领域。国际气候政策的设计越符合中国自身的兴趣并考虑中国独特的能源政经条件,共同发展CCS应对气候变化就越有效。
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/3294
在报告的第二部分,何钢为中国应对这项重要科技应采用的技术和政策提出了自己的建议。
“中国的地质条件相对复杂,对于可能作为碳储存的含煤盆地、含气盆地、含油盆地和深层盐构层等陆地和近海盆地结构,应加强地质调查研究”
一些研究和政策要求在中国规模化发展CCS,却往往忽略了中国的现实条件,结合中国的实际情况和战略需要,现阶段做好CCS技术与政策的相关储备成为当务之急。
首先,加强能力建设。第一,分析和评估CCS技术路线。CCS技术目前还未臻成熟,因此,需要对中国未来能源战略有着重要影响的煤制油、IGCC等技术及其CCS技术进行重点研发与示范。对于中国未来CCS技术路线进行分析与评估。第二,加强碳储存的研究。中国的地质条件相对复杂,对于可能作为碳储存的含煤盆地、含气盆地、含油盆地和深层盐构层等陆地和近海盆地结构,应加强地质调查研究,对于地层结构、储存潜力、泄漏风险、监测可能等方面进行全面调查与评估。第三,增强风险管理的能力。对于CCS技术的各个环节捕获、运输和储存过程中的风险进行系统评估和管理。第四,建立CCS治理结构和相关法律法规。最后,促进公众参与CCS的研究,通过宣传教育,加强公众对于CCS及其价值与风险的了解。
其次,拓宽资金来源。由于当前国内能用于CCS的资金非常有限,国际资金的投入和支持显得非常重要,目前资金转移也主要通过国际碳市场来实现。清洁发展机制(CDM)作为京都三机制之一,在激励发展中国家参与全球减排行动中发挥了重要作用,目前执行委员会(EB)正在讨论把CCS纳入CDM项目的范畴,但争议仍然非常大,反对者认为CCS可能产生的减排量将削弱CDM机制下经核证的减排量(CER)市场的有效性。即使把CCS纳入到CDM的项目范畴中,在现行的市场下,CO2 的价格是8-23欧元/吨,远低于CCS的成本(50-100欧元/吨),每吨缺口仍达30-60美元,必须通过其他手段来筹集CCS所需要的资金。此外,CER价格的浮动也使得CCS更难以吸引稳定的投资者。而行业减排机制,虽然有可能把电力行业作为整体纳入碳减排的安排,也仍在研究和探讨中。因此,国际气候变化协议必须寻求新的金融机制以满足CCS规模化发展的需要。
第三,深化国际合作。国际上对于CCS的探索仍在继续:英国通过新的立法,要求新建电厂项目必须安装CCS,否则将不允许上网。美国将投入10亿美元重启“未来发电”(Future Gen)项目,并将重点建设在伊利诺伊州的IGCC+CCS示范电站。欧盟经济振兴计划将10.5亿欧元投资用于7个电厂的CCS发展,并将在2015年建立一个具备12个示范电厂规模的CCS联盟。中国和美国也于2009年7月份提出建立中美联合清洁能源中心。随着中美、中加、中英、中欧、中日、中澳等双边或多边气候变化合作的CCS领域进一步深化,中国将与全球CCS同行建立联系、跟踪进展、了解动态、交流问题与经验(Know-how),为中国掌握 CCS技术并参与全球应对气候变化挑战的努力奠定基础。
欲获取更多的详情,请点击下载Richard Morse, Varun Rai及Gang He合作的研究报告全文:《Real Drivers of CCS in China and Implications to Climate Change Policy》
何钢:美国斯坦福大学能源与可持续发展研究中心助理研究员。联系方式:ghe at stanford.edu 一个偶然的机会,我们成了倪德卫(David Nivison)教授的房客。Nivison教授号称是“N”大汉学家之一,N等于几取决于比较的范围和定义的程度。教授对中国历史、文化、哲学,当然还有中国菜,不止是非常感兴趣,而是颇有研究,这不仅让我们有了一个安静的居处,也让我们的晚餐时间多了很多乐趣。此文作为榆木斋的一个补录,相信还会有很多“故事”。
动情之“Life is real”!
第一次见面,或者也可以说是面试,是在他家里,吃完晚饭,他问我们结婚多久了,然后突然深情地回忆起他的太太,或者他问我们就是想介绍他太太给我们。他和太太44年结婚,直到08年去世,一起走过了64年的风风雨雨。64年,他说“Life is real”!这是他每每想起太太的深情。他还曾说起过,在家里其实也很想讲他的研究,可是大概没有多少愿意听他的,太太也许也是,直到有一天他的太太过世前夕,也是他的新书付梓的时候,他太太听到他的书快出来,宽慰的微笑才满足的睡去,而他也深受感动。我永远都忘不了那低头的沉吟,良久,或者是一滴泪润散的时间。而这一天竟然是中秋,难道是巧合?
汉学家之“Crazy foreigner”
我其实很好奇他做的研究,他有两本书,一本书是《章学诚的生平及其思想》,另一本是《西周诸王年代研究》;前者是他的博士论文,后者是他后半辈子的研究。他说他做的有些研究是从甲骨文、金文等来定时间。所以只有像他这样的“Crazy foreigner”才会对这些感兴趣。他说他爱中国,除了“断代工程”。因为据说组织了很多专家做了4年,但是对他提出的一些问题却没有回答。那么遥远的历史,大概要很严谨的考证和反复的验证才能有一些猜测,这是我学历史一直没学明白的地方。他是洪业和杨联升的学生,杨联升还有一个学生,可能大家都知道,就是余英时。而他在哈佛的时候,周一良正在哈佛读研究生,周的太太是他太太的中文老师,这个世界真是很有趣。
如果我收到那封信
有一次晚上吃饭的时候教授突然说起他在翻读50-60年代的信件,他妈妈将他和许多人的通信保留得很好并在走之前交给了他。他说第一次看到他岳父写给他的一封信,不知道什么原因,他从来没有见过。而现在读到非常震惊,信中给了他很多建议,包括继续读拉丁文和古典研究,说战后这些研究一定会复兴;还包括对中文和日文的看法。教授认为他建议的不读中文、日文是错的,但是前面一点是对的,如果听从了他的建议,他太太的人生也许会好一些,而他的人生也会完全不一样,因为确实战后这些研究都复兴了。而其实他也很顺利,哈佛毕业就到了斯坦福,一干就是一辈子。我从来没有觉得他如此“懊恼”,或者是回顾人生的一种遗憾,或者是对他太太过于思念和爱怜。我不知道我老了会不会有类似的遗憾,但这个时候我还是装着很镇静的安慰他,我们都说“上帝关上一扇门,他一定会给你留一扇窗”,但有时为了给你开一扇窗,他也许会先关上某扇门。
找到了人生后三十年要做的事情
教授聊起来他的研究,少不了一些tipping point,人生最关键的也许就那么几步。他回忆说刚到斯坦福的时候,学校让他教一些他不喜欢的课。后来他一个伯克利的朋友,也是个历史学家,跟他介绍起中国的夏商周断代的问题,他突然就觉得他找到了人生后三十年要做的事情了。我不知道他是怎么学习甲骨文,怎么从历史的堆里找到那些散碎的资料,怎么连贯和佐证相关的证据。他研究的一些结论是夏朝的存在有不确定性。谈到中国学者说他的研究,提到有一篇文章只遮掩的说“国外有学者有其它的说法,但还缺乏证据”。他说,他要一本书来证明自己的观点。对不懂的东西,只听而已。不过,我不怀疑学者的真诚,毕竟,谁愿意押上自己一辈子的时间。我有时候会想他做那个决定的那时的心情。
80年代的中国
教授偶尔也会给我们将他在中国的经历,有一次去太原开会,会后一个农民家看到梨子,就想买一些尝尝,结果比划了半天,农民伯伯终于知道他想干什么的时候,才发现自己已经被一群农民兄弟围着,那时候,中国更别说农村,还没有几个见过外国人的。还有一次去爬泰山,在一家餐厅吃饭的时候被一个年轻人瞪,他也瞪着那个年轻人,尴尬了一会,他对着年轻人说,“你吃了吗?”年轻人听到后嘴角的笑让他至今想起来还印象深刻。既然是中国,自然是少不了中餐,他和他的太太刚开始学习做中餐的时候,他说就是把中餐的原料放到一起,就装作自己在做中餐了。
那些汉学家们
除了倪德卫,我还想起一些飘过的汉学家们,对他们的学问是没有什么可评价的,因为基本上不懂,可是对他们的中文名字的喜欢度,也许可以做一个排名:费正清(John King Fairbank)、史景迁(Jonathan D. Spence)、马悦然(Göran Malmqvist)、罗思高(Scott Rozelle)、施寒微(Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer)、季北慈(Bates Gill)、李约瑟(Joseph Terence Montgomery Needham)。说到李约瑟,想起来唐晓峰老师的课,我选了林毅夫老师主讲的题目“李约瑟之谜”,唐老师在我讲完后就问了一个问题,李约瑟是什么,我一时语塞,现在想来,充分说明了无知者还无畏是多么可怕的事情。
9月27日 看到老罗介绍“龙姑姑”的新书,循着找到一个摘录的博客,转录了龙先生《大江大海·一九四九》的部分篇章,忍不住就读了新书先读的这些故事。让我最触动的是《十万大山》,讲述了“见过你大爷”时一批被共军追剿的“匪军”颠沛流离穿越十万大山,最后逃到中越边境,缴械后却被法军押至富国岛集中营,三年后乃遣送台湾的故事。一个无辜学生挟带的《古文观止》如何伴随所有这些普通人的生活并成为台湾“中州豫剧队”和豫衡中学的种子。
大学时跟随老蔡去广西做项目,多少见识过一点十万大山,想想原始森林对于环保人来说是“地球之肺”,而对于后有追兵前面是未知的一切的逃亡的士兵和他们的家人来说,这就是“人间地狱”了。学习地理的一个偏好自然是地图,更何况有了Google Earth/Map这样的工具,不禁查了一下富国岛的位置。网上多是富国岛的旅游攻略,绝少提这样一段历史,不过如果有机会去到那里,再翻翻十万大山的云和雾,想想这一群人,普通人,在一个“伟大”的年代,走过怎样的迷途,又经历了怎样的挣扎。
还有一个原因大概是《古文观止》也曾是大学时代我床头的睡前读物,虽然不及我床头对面的轩轩翻烂的宋词三百,但我记得是岳麓出的蓝皮本,编排的文章大都还耳熟能详,部分篇章也许还能串起一二,纵横捭阖、壮怀激烈或讽喻古今的古文字,陪伴了不少青春的梦。当然了,在龙的1949年的追寻里,这本书的命运和故事就完全被赋予了不同的意义。试想只有一本书的学校,但也正是这本贯穿上下五千年多少仁人志士、文人骚客的汇集,穿越了烽火与“屈辱”,直达文化与人性的根底。
很久以前,第一次看到龙先生的照片,竟然是个女士,才知道先生也可以是巾帼的。而《中国人你为什么不生气》,大概也是早期的民主和公民意识的脚本。说来龙先生的文字是锵锵有力的,当然,安德烈、目送也还是一席平凡的温情。天下杂志有《大江大海》全部的专访和演讲,包括台湾场、香港场和采访的一些片段,或者也值得一看。
虽说龙先生说这本书不是冲60周年的大庆来的,但是,如果在这样的日子,除了阅兵,还有读书,有倾听、诉说、反思、宽容、理解和融合的话,也许是更平和与深刻的纪念。想起了一段话,大意是说20岁如果没有理想,是可悲的;如果50岁还在谈理想,同样是可悲的。说到这里,改编一下这句话,也许可以说如果大学时代没有参加过“游行”,是遗憾的;如果大学毕业还为“游行”沸腾,也是令人遗憾的。十年前,我刚好大学入学,也恰好是另一场阅兵。是为记。 9月25日 气候变化峰会落幕,哥本哈根就在眼前,气候变化好像就变成一个关键词,环保或者政治都像要念着气候变化的“紧箍咒”,去抢占“道德”或者“低碳”的高地。而我也承认哥本哈根也像是一道坎,不越过这道坎,人类面对危机的信心要受很大打击。作为搞气候变化的分子,当然希望紧箍咒念叨得更快一些,也希望这个坎给迈过去。不过呢,有时也会想,假如没有气候变化,世界又会怎样?
比方说,
没有气候变化的世界
贫困:千年发展目标
疾病(HIV/AIDS):?
战争:?
没有气候变化的中国
贫困:三农、发展经济
民生问题:住房、教育、医疗等等
社会不公、不稳定:河蟹
贪污腐败:政治改革、公民社会
污染:环境保护
还可以列很多……
这些问题,应该说都是困扰人类或者纠缠中国很久,那我们再来看,气候变化跟他们是个鸟关系。贫困,气候变化可能会加剧贫困,或者贫困地区生态脆弱地区也是受气候变化影响最严重的区域,没有什么可以评价的指标,很多贫困不是气候变化引起的,但是确实会有一个恶性循环的加剧作用。比方说绿和的报告的说明。疾病也是同此凉热。战争不排除因为气候变化引发大型灾难或者资源型的战争,目前还不能说。
而把气候变化与中国的问题靠,你会发现,还占不上队呢。这也是我为什么严重欣赏和同意CJL的问题,相对于其他因素(以下略去千字)造成的问题和痛苦,气候变化不能说鸟都不是,但真的算不上最大的挑战。不过能源危机、气候影响和国际压力,中国也必须有所姿态,更何况应对气候变化和应对能源与其他挑战并行不悖。同时似乎还酝酿了新一轮全球竞争的机遇。高举气候变化的伟大旗帜,向着低碳经济的道路快跑。
所以,
是要给气候变化足够的重视,但是也不要上升到“世界末日”灾难片的高度。应当视气候变化为一个各国合作的“可能”,大概没有一项环境挑战像气候变化这样需要全球协力合作共同应对。如果的如果,人类能在应对这样的挑战上走的更深远,其意义非同小可。气候变化要和其他系统一起来解决问题,这就是为什么C提出来政治改革和环境保护的关系。哥本哈根也就是一个会而已,会有谈判、表演、争论甚至掐架,也不怀疑至少会有一个文件告诉我们:这是我们的共识。而真正的行动岂是一个哥本哈根可以搞定的事情,也大概也是搞气候变化的分子不可不知的“令人不适的事实”。
9月24日 话说胡哥在联合国气候变化峰会开幕式上的演讲颇得好评。
除了套话以外,还谈了四点:“中国将进一步把应对气候变化纳入经济社会发展规划,并继续采取强有力的措施。一是加强节能、提高能效工作,争取到2020年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年有显著下降。二是大力发展可再生能源和核能,争取到2020年非化石能源占一次能源消费比重达到15%左右。三是大力增加森林碳汇,争取到2020年森林面积比2005年增加4000万公顷,森林蓄积量比2005年增加13亿立方米。四是大力发展绿色经济,积极发展低碳经济和循环经济,研发和推广气候友好技术。”
很有意思,第二点和第三点都用了定量数据,而第一点只用了“显著下降”,多少算显著?不知道是不是十五20%的节能减排压力不小,不能轻易承诺。另外,对于第二点,有些分析貌似偷换了概念,2008年,光水电就占发电总量的16%了,以为这很好实现。可人家胡总说的是可再生能源和核能占“一次能源”的比重,而不是发电的比重。贴个图很容易看出这两者的区别。即便是算上三峡这样的大家伙,水电也只占一次能源的6%。核能只占1%。到2020年,核能能占到4-5%就不错了,剩下的靠水电、风电和太阳能及生物能、地热等共同实现,难度还是非常大的。
 8月28日
PESD researchers Richard Morse, Gang He, and Varun Rai offer a unique analysis of China's carbon capture and sequestration efforts, which are now widely viewed as critical for stabilization of the global climate. They argue that China's energy security interests are the primary drivers of current CCS projects. Contemplating CCS at scale in the Chinese context, they argue that Chinese energy markets present special obstacles for deploying CCS in China and offer insights into how international climate policy can engage this crucial problem.
Appeared in PESD Working Paper Series, August 27, 2009 AUTHORS Richard K. Morse - Research Associate at PESD Varun Rai - Research Fellow at PESD Gang He - Research Associate at PESD
The capture and permanent storage of CO2 emissions from coal combustion is now widely viewed as imperative for stabilization of the global climate. Coal is the world’s fastest growing fossil fuel. This trend presents a forceful case for the development and wide dissemination of technologies that can decouple coal consumption from CO2 emissions—the leading candidate technology to do this is carbon capture and storage (CCS). China simultaneously presents the most challenging and critical test for CCS deployment at scale. While China has begun an handful of marquee CCS demonstration projects, the stark reality to be explored in this paper is that China’s incentives for keeping on the forefront of CCS technology learning do not translate into incentives to massively deploy CCS in power plant applications as CO2mitigation scenarios would have it. In fact, fundamental and interrelated Chinese interests—in energy security, economic growth and development, and macroeconomic stability—directly argue against large-scale implementation of CCS in China unless such an implementation can be almost entirely supported by outside funding. This paper considers how these core Chinese goals play out in the specific context of the country’s coal and power markets, and uses this analysis to draw conclusions about the path of CCS implementation in China’s energy sector. Finally, the paper argues that effective climate change policy will require both the vigorous promotion and careful calculation of CCS’s role in Chinese power generation. As the world approaches the end of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and crafts a new policy architecture for a global climate deal, international offset policy and potential US offset standards need to create methodologies that directly address CCS funding at scale. The more closely these policies are aligned with China’s own incentives and the unique context of its coal and power markets, the better chance they have of realizing the optimal role for CCS in global climate efforts. 8月22日
后人有诗云: 秋高气爽桂花汀,云淡风轻碧空盈。 此生最幸恰逢君,前路漫漫携手行。
背景音乐之Miles away:
Madonna - Miles Away
I just woke up from a fuzzy dream And I never want to see the things that I have seen I looked in the mirror and I saw your face You looked back through me, you were miles away.
All my dreams, they fade away I'll never be the same If you could see me the way you see yourself And pretend to be someone else
You'll always love me more Miles away I hear it in your voice when we're Miles away You're not afraid to tell me Miles away I guess we're at our best when we're Miles away
So far away So far away So far away So far away So far away So far away So far away So far away
When no ones around and I have you here I begin to see the picture it becomes so clear You always have the biggest heart when we're six thousand miles apart
Too much alone sound uncomfortable silence can be so loud Those three words are never enough when it's long distance love...
You always love me more miles away I hear it in your voice when you're miles away You're not afraid to tell me miles away I guess we're at our best when we're miles away
So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away
I'm alright Don't be sorry But it's true When I'm gone.. You'll realize that I'm the best thing that happened to you...
You always love me more miles away I hear it in your voice when you're miles away You're not afraid to tell me miles away I guess we're at our best when we're miles away
You always love me more miles away I hear it in your voice when you're miles away You're not afraid to tell me miles away I guess we're at our best when we're miles away
So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away So far away so far away
So far away so far away
8月13日 最近在思考的问题:中国到底要不要发展CCS,如何发展CCS?
Fact Sheet: 碳捕获和碳储存:简单说就是把直接排放到大气中的CO2捕集起来打到地下去,从而降低大气中的温室气体浓度。 中国(已经/或迟早将)成为最大温室气体排放国,2008年排放达68亿吨,占全球总排放的21.8%(BP能源统计)。 70%的能源依赖煤;80%的电力来自于煤;2001年到2008年,火电装机容量翻倍,从300GW到600GW(2008电力统计快报)。 要实现2℃目标(450ppm),2050年前,全球平均每年约需减排50-100亿吨(IPCC,IEA情景分析),其中14-19%要通过CCS来实现。 碳捕获的平均成本约为30美元/吨(保守估计),碳储存的平均成本为10美元/吨(乐观估计),储存潜力(远景)可达23000亿吨(PNNL)。全球CCS平均成本50-100美元/吨。 全球碳市场的价格,CER:15-30欧元/吨(点碳)。缺口30-60美元/吨。 2009年7月,全球第一个CCS示范项目大瀑布电力公司在德国北部的电厂捕获运行不错,碳储存阶段却因为地方居民的反对歇菜了(路透)。
争论焦点: 中国是否定量减排?减排多少? CCS可以发挥多大作用?成本代价几何? 技术路线选择?未来前景?
正方观点: 以煤为主的能源结构决定了大量排放 中国受气候变化影响以及全球应对气候变化的国际压力增大 发电厂仍然是最大的温室气体来源 CCS技术已经基本成熟,在于国际机制的设计 Know-how(没找到好的翻译)以及潜在技术出口机遇
反方观点: CCS技术还不成熟,不确定性仍然很大 CCS的成本非常大,除有EOR和ECBM外基本是烧钱 碳储存还未可知,中国地质条件非常复杂,不确定性较大 运输和储存过程中的风险,如泄漏等 中国尚无减排义务 CCS无溢出效应:不生产GDP,不解决就业 有这个钱干点啥不好:节能减排、可再生能源
被忽视的成本: CCS的能源损失,约为20-23%,由此造成的煤炭使用增量将通过煤炭产业链条扩散到整个能源系统。 被忽视的事实: 煤电矛盾长期存在,电厂无法连煤炭成本都无法消化,哪能消化CCS增加的成本。
结论: No easy CCS, No quick CCS. 能力建设(技术储备、地质调查、风险评价、公众参与) 主动CCS:对于符合中国能源战略的CCS技术和项目优先开展 被CCS:加强国际合作、学技术、引资金、搞创新 提高能效节能减排是王道,新能源可再生能源清洁能源是正道
欢迎讨论。 8月12日 Quote
手冢不二之:给孩子们的教科书
引子 话说手冢和不二在西葛西度过了快乐的夏天后(请参照前文《 租赁协议》),手冢终于鼓起勇气求婚,不二看着Tiffany的钻戒,眨巴眨巴眼睛说: “好。” 手冢乐得拉着不二的手,第二天就去见不二的爸妈。 不二的爸爸很严肃,打量着手冢,问道: “手冢君是学什么专业的?” 手冢毕恭毕敬地回答:“环保。” 不二爸爸想了想,认真地说:“学环保好啊,不二从小就不太会收拾屋子,你正好可以……” 多日后,不二鹦鹉学舌地把这事讲给同样学环境的大石和学国关的菊丸听,菊丸乐不可支,指着窗外一辆“保洁”车,对大石说,“大石,快看,你们院车!” ————背上不明之冤的分割线———— 再过了一段时间,手冢和不二决定搬到太平洋的另一边——加州湾区,因为手冢在那边找到了一份很环保的工作。两人也过上了男耕女织的生活。就这样,斗转星移,转眼已是第二年的春夏之交。 有一天,不二接到同在湾区朋友的电话,去附近的一个地方BBQ。 不二记下地址,在google map上搜了一下,离住的地方1个多小时的车程,叫Livermore。 手冢凑过头来看了一眼,“哦,这里有很多好玩的。” “哦?”不二有点诧异地回头看看手冢,“有哪些好玩的?” 手冢凝神屏气地细想了一会,认真地说:“有个国家实验室。” ————手冢君是学术男的分割线———— 话说这天手冢回家的时候,看到不二正在键盘上飞快的打字。 手冢问:“亲爱的,干啥捏?” 不二说:“国光桑,在写日记。” 手冢定睛一看,《给孩子们的教科书》。 手冢感动地:“不二,你真的开始考虑……” 不二:“没,写着玩。” 手冢定睛一看,好家伙,把我们的吵架记录地清清楚楚。 不二(振振有辞):“为我们的孩子现身说教,让他们少走弯路。” 6月21日
这是一个关于“地球和人类”的故事:一个关于地球发育成长的故事,也是一个关于人类走火入魔的故事。这是一个关于自然和文明的故事,这也是一个关于希望和承诺的故事。如诗如画,如倾如诉,如琢如磨。(地球)美得令人窒息,(人类的破坏)痛得让人心焦。在唯美的画面面前,任何语言都显得苍白。它融合了戈尔《一个让人不适的事实》的科学和简练,承继了雅克·贝汉《微观世界》、《鸟的迁徙》和《喜马拉雅》的细致和生动,延展了罗利《人类消失后的世界》的想象和警醒。总之,地理视觉盛宴环境思想荟萃,值得一看。
高清英文版:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jqxENMKaeCU
优酷:http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XOTkzMzY0NjQ=.html
地球数字:
20%的世界人口消耗了80%的地球资源
全球军费开支多于援助发展中国家经费的12倍
每天有5千人死于受污染的食水,10亿人没有干净的饮用水
10亿人在饱受饥饿
全球超过50%销售的谷物用于喂食牲口与生化燃料上
全球40%耕地质量下降
每年有1300万公顷的林地给毁灭
1/4的哺乳动物、1/8的鸟类、1/3的两栖动物濒临绝种,生物品种的死亡率快于自然速度1000倍
75%的渔产品已耗尽或面临耗尽
过去15年的平均温度是有纪录以来的最高
冰冠的厚度40年来减少了40%
到2050年,可能导致多达2亿的气候难民
5月22日
正准备继续写“争论的焦点”,看了一下新闻。
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES)《美国清洁能源与安全法案》已经通过了Energy and Commence委员会的投票,33:25有惊无险。委员会共59人,35个民主党,24个,ACES只要争取过30就稳过。共和党必然是全反对票,而这次比需要的还多了三票,看来只要民主党达成“统一战线”,这一关还是能过的。
这应该是值得记录的进展,等待他们的将是下一关,众议院的全体投票。且观之~
5月20日 自从巴马“书记”当选了美国总统,就要面临如何兑现自己的政治承诺而不变成空头支票;这些承诺有且不限于从2012年开始10年投资1500亿用于清洁能源技术;减少对国外进口石油的依赖;推广100万混合动力汽车;到2020年25的能源来自可再生能源。而多米诺的金融危机又给这张支票圈了几个零,在“美国复苏和再投资法案”中,就提出了将近600亿美元的清洁能源投资计划,希望借此助推启动美国的经济和绿色就业。而钱从哪里来呢?不是印钞票就可以搞定的,巴马政府就开始打这个“限额交易”的主意了。
奥巴马向国会提交的2010年联邦的财政预算表明,从2009到2019,限额交易的拍卖收益将达6460亿美元。其中1200亿美元将用于清洁能源技术。而其他5257亿美元将用于“Making
Work Pay”税收减免计划。这方案还没通过,钱别说还没到手,起码还处于空中楼阁尚未落地状态,奥巴马的几个“孩子”已经嗷嗷待哺。所以,这个法案对于白宫的重要性自然不必说了,从联邦政府来看,美国清洁能源和安全法案,既可能是个钱袋子(这点有点像发彩票),又可创造绿色就业,还可增强能源安全,真是一石多鸟的好事情,可是法案能否跟随白宫的如意算盘呢,必然充满了妥协和争夺的博弈。
值得一提的是,EPA的署长大概很High,因为预算将其2010年其经费将从2009年的76亿美元增加到105亿美元,增幅达37%。其中1900万美元专门用来实施环保署的温室气体排放清单,这也是为限额交易做准备,可见EPA的职能那是有相当坚实的基础。而DOE的预算只有小小的涨了一下,从260亿美元到264亿美元,其中有34亿美元用于CCS的示范与开发。而国防的预算达5338亿之多,差不多占到了总预算35500的15%,不知道还有什么脸批评中国的国防预算。
美国的气候变化政策在布什同志的折腾下,不仅是站到了“错误的历史上”,而且是在错误的路上越走越远,不仅是退出了京都议定书,而且是屡屡不合作,所以才有在巴厘会上被痛批“Get out of the way”的插曲。奥巴马上台后提出了一系列发展清洁能源,应对气候变化的措施,任命Todd Stern为气候变化特使,希望通过新的国际气候协定来重建美国在国际气候变化谈判中的领导地位。美国的部分公众也早已对布什政府在气候变化问题的逆流而动失望,民众对气候变化的关注和支持度还有待观察,但这些积极的转变在悄悄改变法案通过的“群众基础”。
从国际情势看,哥本哈根的谈判就在眼前。从UNFCCC的网站上都有倒计时以增强紧迫感。报道谈中国、澳大利亚和美国已经向联合国提交了各自后京都的谈判议案。中国的提案主要针对发达国家,要求发达国家到2020年至少将温室气体排放比1990年的水平削减40%,目前应该还没有哪个减排计划超过这个数字。澳大利亚表示,如果后京都方案中各国都承诺愿为到2020年将大气中温室气体浓度控制在450ppm之内采取行动,澳大利亚则愿意在2020年将其排放量比2000年的水平削减25%;但是,如果国际社会无法达成高度共识,其国内可能只会采取将2020年的排放量比2000年削减5%到10%的目标。一直在谈判中发挥领导作用的欧盟应该会有更先锋的表现。美国的目标大致就是上述讨论的目标。但是如果这个法案未获通过,美国政府在后京都谈判上大概难有何作为。
可是,美国普通老百姓也许不那么关心也不那么在意气候变化,排在在气候变化前,经济、医疗、就业、油价等等,那才是切身利益相关的,碳税,那基本上很难,限额交易,那也许还能行;他们需要在科学、政策、利益的辩论,现实的教育和反复的权衡,或者在无意中投票的决定。而利益集团的渗透和游说,大概也会为改变增加重重阻力。不过,CHANGE还是让他们度过了“基本靠等”的年代,而进入“基本靠争”的时期。这个国家的领袖,也许可以唤起重返“美国梦”的热情,但却无法改变民众对于自身利益的关切。而如果不出于对这这种“切身利益”的关切,人民抛弃他们的领袖也是非常无情的。但愿,通过这个法案的时机已经成熟。 5月19日
Cindy提起了关于“The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009”的一些讨论,想来好好学习研究一下。这个法案由Henry Waxman和Edward Markey提出,所以也称Waxman-Markey Bill。Waxman来自加州,Markey来自麻州,这都是美国在气候变化问题上最积极的两个州。2007年,正是麻州胜诉EPA要把温室气体作为污染物来管理,而加州就更不必说,2006年就通过了AB32,并提出来2020年减至1990年水平,2050年在1990年水平上减少80%,这个大概是非常雄心的目标。即使奥巴马竞选时提出来的目标,也只是到2050年在2005年基础上减少80%。
这个Waxman-Markey Bill之所以重要,是因为他很大程度上将决定美国国内气候变化政策的走向,而后京都的谈判没有美国的有效参与,也基本上很难达成实质性的进展。
首先,来看看这个法案到底说了啥,最后投票的文本肯定会有很多不同,但大方向应该不会有太大变化。主要包含了四个部分内容:
清洁能源:其中包括通过要求电力零售商强制销售一定比例的可再生能源使得可再生能源从2012达到6%到2025年达到25%。进行CCS的示范,以及更大范围商业化推广CCS的激励机制。清洁燃油和汽车。智能电网、电力传输等等。
能效:在建筑、制造、电器、交通(又提到了加州的小型车标准)、水电气(电和气到2012年分别节省1%和0.75%;到2020年则要比照常发展累计节省15%和10%)、工业、公共事业和联邦政府领域全面提高能效。
气候变化:通过限额交易(Cap-and-Trade)来管理85%的温室气体排放,以达到与2005比较,到2012年降低3%,2020年降低20%,2030年降低42%,2050年降低83%。允许从国际市场购买碳补偿,但一年不能超过2亿吨,并且只能按4/5(买五算四)记账。减排额度还可一定条件下拆借,还有25亿吨的战略储备,敢情就是另外一种“货币”了。补充温室气体标准。
过渡:保证国内企业的竞争力(用能大户和产品销往全球的企业);绿色就业;消费补贴;承诺向发展中国家输出清洁技术,但是有条件就是必须签署国际条约并承担相应适当的实质性温室气体减排计划才能获得支持。适应气候变化。
长达648页的法律文本自然围绕以上方方面作了许多细致的定义、分析和规定,不过最为关注的可能就是法案中提出的针对温室气体的限额交易制度。比较有意思的是EPA被授予了很多职权,比方说温室气体的管理,如果要限额交易,那EPA就在SO2方面的限额交易建立起了较为成熟的机制,前不久又提出了温室气体报告的规程,应当也是为这个做技术和制度上的准备。 5月11日 书扇示门人
范仲淹
一派青山景色幽,前人田地后人收。 后人收得休欢喜,还有后人在后头。
老J的提醒,搜罗出了范同学的这篇诗作,可持续发展思想的朴素表达。
3月31日
前一段和Victor教授讨论中国化石能源储量问题,V的一番解释说明,觉得很受启发。之前蔡老师“自然资源导论”也谈资源的理论储量、远景储量、探明储量和可开采储量。不过储量确实是一个值得探讨的问题,把“资源”转变为“储量”尤其是可开采的储量,大概会瘦身。数字本身的意义也许不是那么大,只能说明,在可见的未来,先说50年吧,中国的煤炭资源保证开采应该还不是一个问题。不过这又有很大的误导性,如果说“资源”短时间还不是一个问题,但储量还是一个问题,尤其是质量高、可进入性强、经济性好的“储量”,不过,谁知道我们有多少家底呢?
The data are complicated and the use of technical terms in the many sources is uneven. This email may, actually, now be the best summary of what is known written in plain English.
COAL
First, on coal. The reserves data are likely to move around a lot. We suggest using IEA as a starting point, and their best guess is 115 billion tonnes (metric) of coal. See IEA’s WEO (2007, which focused on China). P.334 has the numbers. Note, however, that this 115 number is in dispute, and most experts think the real number for proved reserves is probably higher, but some think it is lower. Barlow Jonker (a leading industry source) puts it at nearly double. And, as with all fuels, the reserve is not the underlying “resource,” which is much larger. “Resources” include undiscovered reserves that are likely or possible to be discovered in future. You might ask how people estimate things that have not been discovered, and the simple answer is voodoo. Geologists make a good guess based on the likely geology and then people pretend the numbers are more robust than they are. Expected RESOURCES for China are about 1 trillion metric tonnes. I don’t think anyone really knows what that number is.
World Energy Council, which is probably the best source for systematic data on reserves. Their most recent (2007) estimate based on data from 2005 is at:
http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/coal_1_1.pdf
They put the Chinese coal reserve number at 115 billion tonnes. This is based on data from the Chinese themselves and is suspiciously identical to the IEA WEO number. I doubt we are looking at independent data.
We have looked at some Chinese sources as well and Gang is checking a few more today. They are all over the map. At the end of this email I append an email from Gang that examines some recent official reporting in China on these data (and data on oil and gas reserves). It suggests that the coal resource (possibly “reserve”, though the Chinese data are not very careful about the huge difference between the two) is about 1 trillion tonnes. I seriously doubt that the actual proved reserve is that large—it is probably more like 100 to 200 billion tonnes.
Looking “on the ground” in China broadly confirms the story that Chinese proved coal reserves are a LOT lower than the available resource. China is finding coal all the time—in effect, it is converting “resource” into proved reserve. In 2008 the country “found” about 20 billion tonnes of coal more than it burned (per China Daily article: “China's newly proved coal reserves fall 43% in 2008” 2009-03-03 1” The amusing thing about this article is that it was complaining that 2008 was a bad year for coal discovery. They “only” found about 23 billion tonnes of coal that year.
Conversions: According to BP, 1 tonne of hard coal is worth about 27 million BTU. According to IEA, the AVERAGE conversion factor (per appendix B in the IEA WEO 2007 report) is 20.2 million BTU. Unfortunately, however, IEA uses regional specific conversion factors that might differ from the global AVERAGE, and that probably applies to China. They don’t publish those regional factors, and thus for now I’d suggest using a conversion factor of about 20 million BTU for IEA coal data. Chinese coal data are particularly hard to work with because the conversion factors differ. BP has a particularly helpful set of conversion factors listed in the last tab of the attached spreadsheet. I tend to work in million tonnes oil equivalent (MTOE) because that is standard outside the US. Once data are in MTOE the conversion factors don’t vary much, but heat content for coal varies wildly and getting the right heat value is tough.
GAS
Second, on gas. IEA (attached) shows on p.328 the numbers for gas, which are: proven reserves 3.720 trillion cubic meters (tcm). Probable reserves (which is a more generous accounting system that includes reserves that almost certainly will be found and booked) are about 5 tcm. BP’s estimate (which is on the attached BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008 edition) for proved reserves is 1.88 tcm. BP and IEA both partially rely on data from Cedigaz, but BP uses other local sources. BP’s reserve number is about 66tcf (in our US units), which isn’t very much gas (but thanks to China’s current low gas consumption rate, booked reserves will last 27 years according to BP reserve and consumption data).
The IEA and BP numbers are much lower than Chinese numbers. The email from Gang (appended below) points to reporting from two official Chinese sources and puts the recoverable gas resource at about 22 TCM (in contrast with the 5 TCM estimate from IEA) and also reports the view of a former oil minister who maintains that the proven gas reserve at the end of 2007 was 4.7tcm, which would be higher than the IEA number and more than double the BP number. If you are looking for bombproof numbers then I’d use IEA or BP, but I’d be shocked in the proved Chinese gas numbers don’t rise a lot in the coming years. There’s a lot of gas in the west that hasn’t been examined closely and also a lot in the center of the country.
As you note in your email, there appear to be huge coalbed methane resources. An attached article (from China’s Ministry of Land & Resources) suggests the number might be 37 TCM, but it is hard to compare that number with the country’s actual gas reserves because 37 TCM is a “resource” (ie, hypothetical and not proved and certainly not available to the market—CBM is just getting started in China). Another source from the same ministry (see below) suggests CBM resources are 27 TCM and the recoverable reserve is 11 TCM. If you wanted to use a long-term number for likely available CBM then the best one is probably 11 TCM. That’s a huge number. For now, what I think we can reliably say about CBM is that it could help provide local gas supply if the country made a big push to gas. My guess, though, is that a big push on gas will also require large gas imports.
Converting gas data into oil- or BTU is done readily with the conversion factors at the end of the BP report (attached).
Let me add the caveat that also applies to coal: the reserves numbers for gas are very poor, in part because there haven’t been incentives to look for non-associated gas. People just found it when looking for oil. Yet most of China’s gas resource is probably non-associated. Moreover, there seems to be very loose use of terms like “resource” and “reserve”.
--------------------
China’s new round of national oil and gas resource evaluation end at 2008 at the official website of its office under China’s Ministry of Land and Resources(MLR), NDRC and Ministry of Finance.
http://www.sinooilgas.com/NewsShow.asp?NewsID=10650
This should be the most updated authoritative reserve data from China part, which is much much higher than the WEO data. (Recoverable resources: China MLR: 22 trillion cubic meters, and WEO: 5 trillion).
http://www.chinamining.org/News/2008-08-19/1219107623d16333.html
China's prospective resources of oil is estimated at 108.6 billion tons, and its oil reserves and production have entered a stage of steady growth, according the latest evaluation result made by a national office for oil and natural gas resource evaluation.
According to the Ministry of Land and Resources, after four years of work, the evaluation shows that China's prospective oil resources reach 108.6 billion tons, geological reserves are 76.5 billion tons, and recoverable resources are 21.2 billion tons. The exploration has come to a medium term.
The prospective resources of natural gas reach 56 trillion cubic meters, geological resources, 35 trillion cubic meters, and recoverable resources, 22 trillion cubic meters. The prospecting and exploration has entered an early term.
The geological resources of coal-bed methane are 37 trillion cubic meters, and recoverable resource, 11 trillion cubic meters.
The geological resources of shell shale oil are 47.6 billion tons, and recoverable shell shale oil, 12.0 billion tons.
The geological resources of oil sand are 6.0 billion tons, and the recoverable resources, 2.3 billion tons.
China's oil production is expected to maintain at 200 million tons by 2030, and natural gas production to keep at 250 billion cubic meters.
The national evaluation of oil and natural gas resources, started in 2003, is jointly organized by the Ministry of Land and Resources, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The work involved more than 1,700 people who are from oil companies, universities and scientific research institutes.
The evaluation of oil and natural gas resources covered the country's 115 basins, that of the coal-bed methane covered 42 coal-bearing basins, that of oil sand resources covered 106 mineral belts in 24 basins, and that of shell shale oil resources, 80 mining areas in 47 basins.
About 21.2 billion tonnes of crude could be developed under the current technology, said the Ministry of Land and Resource.
China is one of the world's biggest producer and consumer of oil.
Last year, it produced 186.66 million tonnes of oil and consumed more than 300 million tonnes.
The nation also produced 69.3 billion cubic meters of natural gasin 2007. The figure was expected to rise to 76 billion cubic meters this year.
3月20日 要了解一个地方的文化,先看那个地方的漫画~以下转~
March 19
昨天看了一晚,把奥巴马就任前后的一些漫画看了一遍,笑得我晚上睡不着,发上来共飨。 
这张漫画是今年三月初的,然后下面这张是一个星期左右以后的:
奥巴马的问题从六个球杂耍变成了八个娃的爸。
上面这幅要解释一下:Sesame Street是美国著名的动画节目,从六十年代开播,这个乞讨的Elmo是里面的主人公。 
奥巴马向共和党示好,被Time这样解释。GOP:Grand Old Party,共和党
这是关于美国食品安全生产的,看看人家是怎么骂花生酱的。
当时震惊全国的哈德逊河着陆让飞行员一夜之间成为全民偶像。
Time是驴党的报纸,骂小布什骂的很有喜感吧。
这个Henry Paulson比较倒霉,布什政府的财长,批钱批多了也挨骂。
经济萧条啊……
这个是骂救助三大汽车巨头的:“好的好的,我知道它能达到40mile/加仑的标准,但它后备箱能装30Brillion刀吗?”
看过《超人》的就不用解释了吧,小布什又挨骂了
瞧这俩笑的多开心。背景提示:20号是白宫易主的日子。
Great Depression啊~~
看过Oscar颁奖典礼的应该对今年的supportive role印象深刻吧(顺便怀念一下断背山),难得的是给共和党颁了个non-supportive role
“快点,再给我一百万。”
又一个骂三巨头的:在Foreclosure的牌子下,两人合计:“怎样才能拿援助?”“造汽车吧。”
想起中国的老话:硕鼠硕鼠,无食我黍。
这幅漫画的含义我也不能很确切的理解。但如果考虑到布什政府对科学家的漠视,似乎可以给我们提供一些视角。
一驴一象。
“你意识到问题了吗?”
“是的,防水布太小。”
骂那个奥巴马提名的财长的。
骂那个伊利诺伊州卖官(seat)的。
如前所述,1月20日奥巴马就职。
又一个骂汽车三巨头的,我超级喜欢这张。 3月16日
周末跟LP恶补了一下奥斯卡的影片,好片年年有,今年特别多。
朗读者:事关尊严,与爱情无关?
换子疑云:失去了所有更没有什么可失去的了,战斗到底。希望是个好东西。
米尔克:我已经40岁了,还没有做过一件让我自豪的事情。同志,走出盒子见阳光,我来招募你。
革命之路:“如果当年Jack爬上木板,生活也就这德性”。梦想有时是个奢侈品。
WALL-E:环保其实不是科幻,可惜了功夫熊猫。
贫民富翁:每一个题目都是我的人生——有点残忍、现实和流转的社会。
突然想起有一段时间的“纯情电影”,比方说《我的父亲母亲》、《我的兄弟姐妹》、《情书》、《小鞋子》、《那人那山那狗》……
成人的“世界”未见得深刻,却真的不好玩。
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